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Introduction
Much of normative economic theory is built on the premises that individuals seek to maximize their "utility" or "welfare,"and that social welfare is the sum (or weighted sum) of individual welfare. Under utilitarianism, or more generally welfarism, it is legitimate to prescribe policies that lead to increase in the welfare of some individuals at the expense of the welfare of other individuals, as long as "social welfare" rises. At some extreme, the life of a person could be sacrificed for "the greater good" of the society. In an intergenerational context, the welfare of a generation can be sacrificed without limit to increase the intertemporal welfare by raising the welfare of other generations. Many philosophers have expressed the concern that utilitarianism, or more generally welfarism, does not take "rights" seriously. They argue that all individuals should be entitled with some basic rights, such as life, health, and a "decent standard of living." John Rawls [23] pointed out that "optimal growth" (under some utilitarian objective) may unreasonably require too much savings from poor generations for the benefits of their wealthier descendants.
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More recently, the same rationale has led environmentalists to argue that the present generations, in their pursuit of wealth and wellbeing, are depriving future generations of their rights to natural assets. Sustainable development has been described in the Brundtland report [33] as development "that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." Current patterns of growth, however, induce concerns for sustainability, and in particular with respect to environmental degradations.
Intergenerational equity and environmental concerns are thus cornerstones of sustainability. Reflecting the concerns for rights, environmental issues are often addressed with quantitative approaches on physical measures, and thresholds. Along these lines, it is argued that society should impose constraints, in the form of floors or ceilings, on various 1 In a similar vein, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) found it disconcerting that earlier generations should carry the burdens for the benefits of later generations. In his essay, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose," Kant put forward the view that nature is concerned with seeing that man should work his way onwards to make himself worthy of life and well-being. He added: "What remains disconcerting about all this is firstly, that the earlier generations seem to perform their laborious tasks only for the sake of the later ones, so as to prepare for them a further stage from which they can raise still higher the structure intended by nature; and secondly, that only the later generations will in fact have the good fortune to inhabit the building on which a whole series of their forefathers...had worked without being able to share in the happiness they were preparing." See Reiss [24] (p.44).
variables. For example, health, education, and biodiversity should not fall below certain levels, while emissions of pollutants should not exceed a certain level. These environmental constraints, when they are effective, induce some "costs" in term of welfare growth.
In the climate change debate, a ceiling of green house gases concentration would impose restriction on the current growth pattern as emissions would have to be curtailed. This is the cost of providing future generations the right to live in a more or less tolerable climate.
When defining such an environmental constraint, current generations trade off this cost and the level of the environmental objective they agree to sustain for future generations.
It is well recognized that if floors are too high and ceilings are too low, the set of possible actions will be empty. Assuming that the set of feasible actions is not empty, there is still the question of trade-offs between floors and ceilings. Martinet [19] described the trade-offs between several sustainability objectives (i.e., quantities that should be sustained), without considering welfare or growth concerns. 2 The thresholds are interpreted as minimal rights to be guaranteed to all generations. Alvarez-Cuadrado and Long [1] examined the implication of a floor on consumption on the growth path of a society that optimally chooses its floor.
In this paper, we propose a criterion for ranking social alternatives, based on an indicator called "Rights and Welfare Indicator" (RWI for short). This indicator combines a welfare index (based on the conventional utilitarian objective of maximizing the integral of the discounted stream of utility derived from the consumption of goods and services)
with an index of rights, such as the right to satisfy basic needs or the right to have access to natural capital and to biodiversity. The index of rights is an aggregate measure of various thresholds representing "sustainability" in a broad sense. As in Martinet [19] , our index of rights is an index of the threshold levels, not of the extent to which society exceeds the various thresholds. This index is non-decreasing in each threshold level. It is likely that increasing any threshold will reduce the welfare index. In this sense, there is a tension between rights and welfare.
We explore the implications of this approach by the means of examining the RWI.
We illustrate these implications on the path of resource use. We put forward the view that society does not seek to maximize "welfare" (in a standard sense offered by welfare economics), but instead makes trade-offs between welfare and rights. Maximizing the value of the Rights and Welfare Indicator (which is not a measure of social welfare) is a way to represent these trade-offs.
Our paper is related to the paper by Alvarez-Cuadrado and Long [1] there is a well-defined "threshold possibility frontier," which is the upper boundary of a "threshold possibility set." While Martinet focused on the choice of thresholds on the threshold possibility frontier, we allow for the possibility that a society may choose to be inside the frontier, because the cost of being on the frontier, measured in terms of forgone consumption of some goods and services, may outweigh the value of guaranteeing a high level of the rights represented by the thresholds.
The threshold possibility frontier delimits a set of feasible thresholds within which a vector of "optimal thresholds" would be chosen. The optimal threshold vector precisely balances the "costs" of thresholds in terms of welfarist consequences (e.g., lower consumption for some generations), and the "moral worth" of thresholds. While the trade-offs are captured by a scalar measure, the latter should not be interpreted as a measure of "generalized welfare."
We show that, depending on the preferences and the relative weight accorded to minimal rights, the optimal development path may either be a constrained utilitarian path, or switch to a development path fully characterized by the minimal rights guaranteed to all generations ("right-based sustainable development"). When the minimal rights constraints are effective, social discount rate is different from the classical utilitarian formulation.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. The motivation of our approach is detailed in Section 2. We present therein the tension between rights and welfare, as well as a brief history of sustainability criteria that puts our criterion in perspective. Section 3 presents the implication of the studied criterion in a finite time framework. The results are illustrated in a model of exhaustible resource allocation. Section 4 presents the implication of the studied criterion in an infinite time framework. The results are illustrated in the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow model of nonrenewable resource depletion and capital accumulation.
Section 5 gathers the implications of our results and our conclusions.
Motivation

Rights versus Welfare
The tension between rights and welfarist considerations has been a subject of debate among philosophers, thinkers, and economists. The Rawlsian theory of justice places rights above welfare. 3 In fact, Rawls's first principle of justice is that everyone should have equal rights:"each person is to have an equal right in the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others." His second principle of justice, the difference principle, insists that social and economic inequalities are acceptable only if they are arranged so that they are "both (a) to the greatest expected benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity."In particular, difference in income is acceptable only if it improves the life prospects of the least advantaged. Rawls acknowledges that economic growth is necessary, because without adequate material resources a society cannot develop institutions that guarantees equal liberties to all. He points out that 3 Rawls's conception of justice has its foundation in the theory of social contract advanced by Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. The initial position conceived by Rawls is a hypothetical situation in which the contracting parties are individuals hidden behind the veil of ignorance: none of them knows his place in society, his natural talents, intelligence, strength, and the like. In other words, the principles of justice are agreed to in an initial situation that is fair.
the difference principle must be modified to allow for economic growth, as a unmodified difference principle would lead to "no savings at all." The need for adequate savings is a major concern for Rawls, because, "to establish effective, just institutions within which the basic liberties can be realized"society must have a sufficient material base. Generations must "carry their fair share of the burden of realizing and preserving a just society."Rawls sketches a theory of "just saving" to modify the difference principle. 4 Wealth creation is necessary for the effective defense of rights and liberties.
Another influential philosopher who stresses the preponderance of rights is Nozick [21] .
He emphasized the importance of property rights, from a somewhat different perspective.
Nozick's work has inspired alternative articulations of libertarian rights with a gametheoretic flavor. 5 In our paper, we abstract from game-theoretic considerations.
Different from the right-based approach to development is the welfarist approach. This latter is based on intertemporal welfare functions (i.e., criteria) describing the intertemporal performance of the economy.
A short history of sustainability criteria
The criterion studied in this paper is formally a generalization of the criterion proposed by Alvarez-Cuadrado and Long [1] , taking into account several rights and sustainability indicators, as in Martinet [19] . To explain the emergence of such a criterion, and the way it gathers rights and welfare in a unified framework, we present a short history of sustainability criteria.
To describe the criteria, we consider a continuous time framework, and assume that the economy is composed of infinitely many generations, to focus on intergenerational equity. We thus make the simplifying assumption that each generation can be assimilated to a representative agent, and do not address intragenerational equity. Let x be a vector of n state variables, and c a vector of m control variables. Denote the instantaneous utility function by U (x(t), c(t), t). The transition equations areẋ k (t) = g k (x(t), c(t), t),
Given the values of the state variables, the control variables at time t must belong to a technologically feasibility set A(x(t), t) which is characterized by a set of s inequality constraints:
For state and decisions, a continuous path is denoted by x(·) or c(·). Given an initial state x(0) = x 0 , a given continuous path of admissible decisions c a (·) generates a single continuous path of economic states x a (·).
The traditional criterion for evaluating intertemporal paths is the discounted utility criterion
where δ > 0 is the constant discount rate. According to this criterion, an economic path starting from initial state x 0 and generated by the decision path c 1 (·) is strictly preferred to an alternative path starting from the same initial state and generated by decisions
. A decrease in the utility level of a generation (no matter how disadvantaged this generation already is and how large is the considered sacrifice) can be justified by a sufficient increase in the utility level of some other generations. This criterion is strongly inequitable, and has been shown to display "dictatorship of the present," a term coined by Chichilnisky [6] . For example, in the case of the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow model, the optimal consumption path under discounted utilitarianism decreases toward zero in the long run [7] . Defining a criterion that accounts for intergenerational equity, and in particular for the long run, has been a challenge of sustainability economics.
An alternative criterion, which is anonymous, is the maximin criterion [4, 28] :
According to this criterion, c 1 (·) is strictly preferred to c 2 (·) if and only if
Many economists (e.g., [6] ) have pointed out that the maximin criterion is insensitive to the utilities of generations that are not the poorest. According to the maximin welfare function (3), an increase in the utility of any generation that is not the least advantaged does not raise social welfare W M m .
The maximin criterion has been strengthened to eliminate some maximin paths that are Pareto Moreover, if it is possible to smooth utility over time, the maximin principle leads to no growth, no matter how small is the initial maximal sustainable utility. There is no concern for growth, which may be an issue if capital accumulation is needed to develop and sustain just institutions.
By applying the idea of the golden rule of economic growth to the sustainability issue, one can define a development path that reaches and sustains the highest possible development level. The resulting criterion is termed Green Golden Rule [3] , and considers only the very long run:
It has been qualified as a dictatorship of the future by Chichilnisky [6] . Two development paths generated by decisions c 1 (·) and c 2 (·) are compared only with respect to their limiting behavior.
The welfare function proposed by Chichilnisky [6] is a weighted sum of two terms.
The first term being the usual discounted stream of utilities. The second term is defined in a way that its value depends only on the limiting behavior of the utility sequence. Formally,
where 0 < θ < 1, 0 < λ(t) ≤ 1,
This criterion is neither a dictatorship of the present nor a dictatorship of the future. It, however, has some limitations (such as the non-existence of a solution for some simple problems).
Alvarez-Cuadrado and Long [1] proposed to modify the Chichilnisky criterion replacing the second term with the minimal level of utility of the trajectory over time. The resulting social welfare function is denoted by W M BR , where the superscript M BR stands for "Mixed Bentham-Rawls":
dominated by other paths that have the same minimum level of utility. See [2, 17] . 7 The original formulation of the criterion is in discrete time and ranks infinite sequences of utility. To be consistent within the present paper, we give the continuous time equivalent.
where 0 < θ < 1. This social welfare function is a weighted average of the standard sum of discounted utilities and a Rawlsian part, which places special emphasis on the utility of the least advantaged generation. The positive weight (1 − θ) on the discounted utilitarian part implies non-dictatorship of the future, just as it does for Chichilnisky's welfare function. 8 The positive weight θ on the Rawlsian part ensures non-dictatorship of the present.
All the criteria presented above weigh the welfare of the various generations differently.
This has strong implications in terms of the discounting. More specifically, the discount rate to be used to evaluate project investment with long run impacts is strongly influenced by the criterion chosen.
The mixed Bentham-Rawls criterion is in sharp contrast to the standard utilitarian tradition (see, e.g., any graduate macro-economic textbook) which would treat a family line as an infinitely-lived individual. Such a textbook position could result in requiring great sacrifices of early generations who are typically poor. In contrast, the M BR criterion avoids imposing very high rates of savings at the earlier stages of accumulation. As regards sustainability concerns, the maximization of the M BR criterion determines endogenously a minimal utility level to be sustained forever. The criterion introduces the idea that all generations (and in particular future generations) have some "right" to enjoy a minimal utility, and that their welfare cannot be sacrificed too much for other generations (in particular present generations). This approach is, however, still utilitarian, and focused on intergenerational equity and the "weight" given to each generation.
In a quite different perspective, Martinet [19] examined a criterion defining several sustainability thresholds. A finite number (I) of sustainability issues are represented by indicators I i (x(t), c(t)) and thresholds µ i . These thresholds are interpreted as minimal rights to be guaranteed to all generations. There are no intergenerational trade-offs.
All generations have the same minimal rights with respect to the sustainability issues considered. The objective is not to weigh the different generations in an intertemporal welfare function, but to define minimal rights representing sustainability. The achievable thresholds are traded off to determine what is guaranteed to all generations, with the following sustainability criterion:
s.t
Martinet's approach focuses on a set of minimal rights, without considering welfare.
The approach proposed in our paper consists in modifying the criterion (6) by changing the minimal utility over time by an index of sustainability thresholds as in problem (7).The levels of the minimal rights are defined endogenously, and come at a "cost" in term of present-value welfare.
In the following sections, we examine the implications of this criterion in a finite time framework (Section 3) and in an infinite time framework (Section 4).
Finite horizon
Consider first the case of a finite horizon T . The initial stocks x k (0), k = 1, 2, ..., n, are
given. The terminal stocks are free, subject to x k (T ) ≥ 0.
Define F(x 0 ; µ 1 , ..., µ I ) as the set of all the economic paths (x(·), c(·)) starting from initial state x 0 and satisfying all the constraints defined by the indicators and the thresholds at all times, i.e.,
Clearly, given the initial stock x 0 , the set F(x 0 ; µ 1 , ..., µ I ) may be empty if the thresholds µ i are too high. It is sensible to consider only thresholds that are consistent with the economic endowment x 0 . For this purpose, let us define the set of feasible thresholds,
Assume that the upper boundary of the set M(x 0 ) can be represented by the equality φ(µ 1 , . . . , µ I ; x 0 ) = 0, and that points below this frontier yield φ(µ 1 , . . . , µ I ; x 0 ) > 0, where
Assume a constant rate of discount δ ≥ 0. A feasible time path (x(t), c(t)) starting from state x 0 yields a welfare indicator
where U (., ., .) is the instantaneous utility function.
We suppose that society places values on the minimal rights guaranteed at all times, i.e., on thresholds µ i , i = 1, . . . , I. This valuation is represented by a function P(µ 1 , . . . , µ I ) that is increasing in each argument µ i .
Our Rights and Welfare Indicator (RWI) is defined by
), where 0 < θ < 1 is the relative weight given to "rights." The parameter θ is taken as given (it can be interpreted as the political weight of the "non-welfarist" proponents). We propose that society maximizes the Rights and Welfare Indicator J:
To maximize the RWI given the vector of initial stocks x 0 ≡ (x 10 , x 20 , ..., x n0 ), the planner chooses the thresholds levels, i.e., the numbers (µ 1 , . . . , µ I ) ∈ M(x 0 ), and the time path c(·) to maximize the above objective function, over all feasible paths given by the set F(x 0 ; µ 1 , ..., µ I ) defined by eq. (8).
The objective function highlights the potential tension between rights and welfare.
For example, maximizing welfare would call for present-bias consumption smoothing, with the utility path tilted toward the present if δ is high enough; but such presentbias consumption smoothing may not be desirable if the emphasis on the right of future generations to have a minimal consumption is very strong. 
The necessary conditions
Since (µ 1 , . . . , µ I ) are constants to be chosen optimally, the optimization problem (9) is an optimal control problem with (µ 1 , . . . , µ I ) treated as control parameters. The necessary conditions for such problems can be derived from Hestenes' Theorem. 10 They are as follows.
Necessary conditions for optimization of the Rights and Welfare Indicator Let π(t) denote the vector of co-state variables, λ(t) the vector of multipliers associated with the technological inequality constraints h j (x(t), c(t), t) ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , s, , and ω(t) the vector of multipliers associated with the right-based constraints
The Hamiltonian for this problem is
and the Lagrangian is
An optimal path must satisfy the following conditions:
(i) The control variables maximize the Hamiltonian subject to the inequality constraints
(1) and (10).
(ii)
(iv) The transversality conditions for the optimal choice of the control parameters
with γ ≥ 0 , φ(µ 1 , . . . , µ I ; x 0 ) ≥ 0, and γφ(.) = 0 , and the transversality conditions for the optimal choice of the final stocks are
(v) The Hamiltonian and the Lagrangian are continuous functions of time, and, along the optimal path,
An example: Exhaustible resource exploitation with joint product technology
Consider an economy with an initial stock of an exhaustible resource S 0 > 0. Let r(t) ≥ 0 denote the rate of extraction. ThenṠ(t) = −r(t). We require that S(T ) ≥ 0.
The economy uses r(t) as an input to produce two consumption goods, denoted by c 1 (t) and c 2 (t) as "joint products" under the production function Allowing free disposal, we can write our production function 11 I.e., the value of the total derivative of L (along the optimal path) equals the value of the partial derivative ∂L/∂t, evaluated at the optimal vectors of controls, states, and multipliers. 12 The joint product technology assumed in this example may well reflect the choice of output levels made by a professor for a given input level r. For instance, c 1 is the number of research papers per year, and c 2 is the number of graduate students per year, while r is "effort" level. Alternatively, for any given quantity of oil (r), various levels of heating (c 1 ) and transport (c 2 ) can be achieved.
generally as
Note that, given T and S 0 , the maximum feasible constant consumption of each good is
Let there be two sustainability indicators, and associated thresholds The RWI to be maximized is
Suppose that
and U (c 1 , c 2 ) = 2c
Characterization of the optimal solution
The characterization of the optimal solution allows us to state the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (Constant consumption in the presence of positive discounting)
If the relative weight of Rights, θ/(1 − θ), exceeds a certain critical value, then the social optimum calls for constant consumption despite positive discounting. This critical value is an increasing function of the discount rate δ.
Proof of Proposition 1: Let us derive all the necessary conditions. Write the (present value) Hamiltonian
and the (present value) Lagrangian
The FOCs are
The transversality conditions are 
Using the fact that 2λ(t)r(t) = π(t) = π ⇐⇒ λ(t) = π 2r(t)
, we obtain from (13)
Substitute this into (14) we get, for i = 1, 2,
Using symmetry, c 1 = c 2 and µ 1 = µ 2 . Let us show that if θ/(1 − θ) is large enough, the solution will be constant consumption, with r(t) = c 1 (t) = c 2 (t) = c * (a constant) where
We must show that the solution (17) satisfies all the necessary conditions. Substitute for c i (t) = c * in equations (15) and (16):
Since a necessary condition is ω(t) ≥ 0, we must check that (18) is non-negative for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Hence π must be chosen such that
Choose π such that this condition holds with equality, i.e.,
for all δ ≥ 0 and T > 0 , with strict inequality if δ > 0 and θ < 1. Then
The necessary condition (11) requires that γ * ≥ 0. This condition is satisfied if and
Clearly, in the special case where θ = 1, condition (19) is satisfied. But even if θ < 1, this condition is also satisfied as long as
NOTE: with equality. Then if we increase δ beyond the threshold δ, the constant consumption path (17) will cease to be an optimal solution.
Implications for discounting
In this subsection, we discuss the policy implications of maximizing the RWI, by offering some economic interpretations of the optimality conditions. From equations (12) and (13), we obtain the social optimal condition
On the other hand, if individuals are price-takers in a perfectly competitive capital market, their intertemporal consumption smoothing (without regards for the thresholds)
implies that
where ρ 1 (t) is the rate of interest facing the consumers (in terms of the consumption good c 1 ). It follows that if the planner's allocation is to be achieved by a decentralized mechanism, the implied rate of interest facing the consumers must satisfy
where
is the marginal cost of consumption c 1 in terms of the resource input.
In particular, if the solution involves constant consumption (symmetric for both goods), then
and thus π c 1 2r
i.e., using (21), the rate of interest offered to consumers are
while the rate of interest offered to producers is zero. This wedge between producer's interest rate and consumer's interest rate implies an interest subsidy to consumers, to counter their natural inclination of tilting consumption toward the present.
As private individuals, consumers tend to discount future consumption too much, violating the constraint on consumption rights of future generations. An interest subsidy counters this incentive by encouraging them to save.
Infinite horizon
Suppose the time horizon is infinite and the rate of discount δ is a positive constant. Then the social planner chooses µ and c(·) to maximize the objective function:
That is, the planner maximizes
Necessary conditions
Let ψ(t) = e δt π(t), ∆(t) = e δt λ(t) and w(t) = e δt ω(t). The current-value Hamiltonian of this infinite horizon problem is
and the current-value Lagrangian is
The first-order conditions of the optimization problem are as follows.
The optimality conditions with respect to the control parameters are, for i = 1, . . . , I,
with γ ≥ 0, φ(µ 1 , . . . , µ I ; x 0 ) ≥ 0, and γφ(.) = 0.
Finally, the transversality conditions with respect to the stocks are lim t→∞ e −δt ψ(t) ≥ 0, and lim t→∞ e −δt ψ(t)x(t) = 0.
An example: The production-consumption economy with a nonrenewable resource
Consider the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow model of nonrenewable resource extraction and capital accumulation [7, 8, 28] . Capital stock is denoted by K(t), resource stock by S(t), resource extraction by r(t) and consumption by c(t). We assume a Cobb-Douglas production function, i.e., F (K, r) = K α r β . The dynamics of this economy are as follows:
We consider the following sustainability indicators of consumption and resource stock,
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I 1 (c, r, S, K) ≡ c , I 2 (c, r, S, K) ≡ S , 13 Several authors have used the production-consumption economy to address the climate change issue (e.g., [9, 29] ). The nonrenewable resource is related to fossil energy. Stabilizing green house gas (GHG) concentrations requires limiting the cumulative emissions over time. The in-ground resource stock is used as a proxy for non-emitted GHG. A limit on cumulative emissions can be represented by a constraint on resource extraction: a part of the stock has to be preserved.
as well as the following rights/sustainability constraints (as in [19, 20] ):
These constraints state that every generation has the right to a minimal consumption at level µ c , and the right to a minimal preserved stock µ S .
The set of achievable minimal consumption and preserved resource stock (µ c , µ S ) is characterized by the following relationship (see [19, 20] ):
The upper boundary of this set satisfies φ(µ c , µ S , K 0 , S 0 ) = 0. It can be represented by the following "threshold possibility frontier":
This curve has a negative slope and is concave, for all µ S < S 0 :
The RWI criterion for U (c(t), S(t)) ≡ U (c(t)) and P(µ
Assume that P(µ c , µ S ) ≡ η c µ c + η S µ S (where η c and η S are non-negative parameters), and that instantaneous utility is derived only from consumption, i.e., U (c(t)).
Consider the objective function
subject toK
and
The objective is then equivalent to maximize the expression
The current value Hamiltonian is
The Lagragian is
The necessary conditions of this problem are
with γ ≥ 0, φ(µ c , µ S ; S 0 , K 0 ) ≥ 0 and γφ(.) = 0, as well as conditions (32), (33) Remark 1 (Logarithmic valuation of rights) If we had specified P (µ c , µ S ) ≡ η c ln µ c +η S ln µ S , then the terms θη c and θη S in the last two equations, (40) and (41) would have to be replaced by θη c /µ c and θη S /µ S . All other equations would remain unchanged.
Characterization of the optimal solution
Interestingly, condition (41) implies the following proposition.
Proposition 2
The optimal solution of the RWI maximization must be one of three types: 
Proof of part 2 of Proposition 2
If µ c > 0, then c(t) > 0 for all t, which implies positive production, and thus positive extraction for all t. 14 The resource stock will thus be declining at any time t ∈ [0, ∞), and the constraint S ≥ µ S will never be binding. It is as if an amount µ S is set aside, and the remaining amount, S 0 − µ S > 0 is extracted, with exhaustion occurring only in the asymptotic sense. The associate shadow value w S is then nil at all times. Assuming that η S > 0, condition (41) can be satisfied only if γ > 0, requiring that φ(.) = 0, which means that the solution (µ c , µ S ) is on the threshold possibility frontier. Let us show that c(t) = µ c for all t (if µ S > 0 and µ c > 0). Suppose that c(t) > µ c + ε over some time interval, where ε is some strictly positive number. Then by re-arranging investment and consumption, it is feasible to ensure that c(t) > µ c + 1 n ε for some number n > 0 for all t. But we have shown that the solution (µ c , µ S ) is on the threshold possibility frontier.
Given µ S > 0, the inequality c(t) > µ c + 1 n ε would contradict the result that (µ c , µ S ) is on the threshold possibility frontier. It follows that c(t) = µ c for all t (if µ S > 0 and µ c > 0).
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Proposition 2 implies that an interior solution of our problem is possible only if there is no strictly positive consumption guaranteed, i.e., µ c = 0. A part µ S < S 0 of the stock may then be preserved. In all other cases, the solution is on the threshold possibility frontier, and consumption is always constant at the level µ c , corresponding to the maximin consumption under the preservation constraint µ S . We devote the next two subsections to study, respectively (i) the binding solution and (ii) the conditions under which µ c = 0.
As we don't know a priori which case corresponds to the optimal solution of our general problem, we differentiate the "optimal" candidates of each case by using a symbol different from the optimality mark used in the Proposition (respectively, * for the binding solution,
andˆfor the interior solution).
Remark 2
In the above proof, we showed that if (µ c , µ S ) > (0, 0) is on the threshold possibility frontier, then c(t) = µ c for all t. Then eq. (36) becomes
This means that
where χ is some positive constant. Thus, using condition (38),
Substituting this into eq. (40)
and using (41), and the definition of χ
Remark 3 In the case of logarithmic valuation of rights (see Remark 1), it is clear that the optimal µ c and µ S are both strictly positive. Hence only part 2 of Proposition 2 applies in this case.
The "binding" solution
Assume that η S > 0. We can characterize the optimal thresholds (µ * c , µ * S ) when they are chosen on the threshold possibility frontier, φ(µ c , µ S , K 0 , S 0 ) = 0.
In this case, it follows from part 2 of Proposition 2 that the solution corresponds to the maximin consumption under a resource preservation constraint [4, 19, 20, 28] . The consumption is constant, at a level
It yields a net present value N P V = 1 δ U (µ * c ) and the constraints yield a sustainability value P(µ * c , µ * S ), so that the maximized RWI level is
. We know µ * S as a function of µ * c when these parameters are on the boundary of the feasibility set from the expression φ = 0. We can define the function µ * S =μ S (µ * c ) from eq. (42).
From the expression of J, and the condition on the optimal choice of the parameters on the boundary, we can derive the solution. It satisfies the following condition:
Net present value gain from increasing the constant consumption level
Gain in terms of guaranteed consumption
Loss in terms of preserved stock
It is shown in the appendix that this feasible solution may satisfy the optimal conditions of the original optimization problem. We shall discuss in subsection 4.2.5 the conditions on the preference parameters for this solution to be optimal.
No guaranteed consumption
We now turn to the case 3 of Proposition 2, and consider the "optimal" solution when µ c = 0. This is the only case that allows the optimal choice (μ c ,μ S ) to be not on the threshold possibility frontier, φ(µ c , µ S , K 0 , S 0 ) = 0.
The optimal trajectory of this case is described in the appendix. The nature of the solution depends on the value of the marginal utility of consumption when consumption is nil (i.e., U (0)). We distinguish two cases: The finite marginal utility case and the infinite marginal utility case. In the finite marginal utility case, it is shown that consumption is positive over a finite time interval, after which the economy stays at a stationary state with no consumption, no capital stock, and the preservation of a resource stockμ S . In the infinite marginal utility case, the consumption is positive at all times, and a part of the stock (S 0 −μ S ) is depleted asymptotically.
Whatever the case, it is possible to define some welfare value function V (S 0 − µ S , K 0 ), depending on the preservation constraint threshold µ S , which satisfies:
The optimal conservation thresholdμ S must solve
Assuming that the previous value function can be characterized, the optimal conservation levelμ S satisfies which is equivalent to
We cannot characterize further the expression ofμ S without knowing the expression of the value function. 17 We can say, however, that there is a unique solution, as the value function is monotonic increasing and concave in the states if utility is strictly increasing and concave consumption.
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Moreover, corner solution are not excludable. On the one hand, if
η S , it is optimal to preserve none of the resource stock, i.e.,μ S = 0. This case corresponds to the unconstrained utilitarian solution. On the other hand, if
η S , it is optimal to preserve all the initial resource stock, i.e.,μ S = S 0 . This case corresponds to case 1 in the lemma.
Parameter conditions
We can then ask what the values θ, η c , η S , δ are, such that (µ c , µ S ) is on the frontier, i.e.,
In particular, we can ask if there is a range of values of θ for which an interior solution occurs.
We have someμ S (θ, δ, η S ) on the one hand, and a µ * c (θ, δ, η c , η S ) and the associated µ * S (θ, δ, η c , η S ) =μ S (µ * c ) on the other hand. Each candidate provides a RWI as follows:
We can say that (µ c , µ S ) = (0,μ S ) ifĴ > J * . It is hard to go further without the expressions of the various candidates (and the value function). Our results, however, suggest that there are some parameters value for which the solution is a discounted utility path with conservation of a part of the resource, and other values for which the solution is driven by the minimal consumption and resource preservation rights. Fig. 1 illustrates these two cases. Note that for P(µ c , µ S ) ≡ η c µ c + η S µ S , the iso-value RWI curves correspond to planes in the space of welfare index and rights (with relative slopes depending on (1 − θ), θη c , and θη S ).
18 For a proof, see [15] . 
Implications for discounting
Let us offer some economic interpretations of the necessary conditions. In the absence of minimal-rights constraints, we would have the following familiar efficiency conditions. First, the Hotelling rule states that the resource price rises at an exponential rate equal to the interest rate facing producers (the marginal product of capital), i.e.,
Second, the Keynes-Ramsey rule states that the rate of growth of consumption is equal to the product of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution σ ≡ −U c cU c and the difference between the interest rate facing consumers, ρ(t), and the utility discount rate δ. In a competitive economy without externalities and policy intervention, the consumption rate of interest ρ(t) is equal to the marginal productivity of capital. The Keynes-Ramsey rule
. This rule can also be expressed as follows,
and tells us that the consumption increases over time (i.e., the rate of change of marginal utility is negative and marginal utility decreases) if the consumption discount rate (the interest rate) is larger than the impatience represented by the utility discount rate. Alternatively, expressing the consumption discount rate as a function of the utility discount rate, the growth rate and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, i.e.,
one gets the usual expression of the discount rate to apply to investment project. It is equal to the sum of pure preference for the present plus the wealth effect.
When the minimal right constraints are binding, these conditions are modified.
If the resource preservation constraint is binding, the dual variable w S is positive, and we have a "modified Hotelling Rule":
That is, if some resource stock is to be kept in the ground after a certain time T , when extraction stops, it must be the case that the resource owners find that, after time T , the price at which they can sell the resource as an input, namely F r (r(τ ), K(τ )) for τ > T ,
does not rise fast enough to compensate for the loss of interest income. (Presumably, at T they can sell the remaining resource stock to the government to keep it in the ground for ever, at the price F r (r(T ), K(T ))).
When the guaranteed consumption constraint is not binding, w c = 0 and we get the usual Keynes-Ramsey rule. When the constraint is binding, the wealth effect is modified.
If the minimal consumption constraint is binding, the dual variable w c is positive, and represent the choice of a democracy where the RWI reflects the preference of voters. The miminal rights are chosen by the voters (who are homogeneous in our model). At the same time, we assume that when individuals make their own private decisions (e.g., how much to consume, how much to bequeath to their children) they are not individually guided by their concern for rights. These latter are implemented by the elected government.
Our examples illustrate the possibility that, at some point, minimal rights are so important that the path of feasible trajectories is reduced to a single path, and the willingness to satisfy these minimal rights intertemporally drives the development path (right-based sustainable development).
We have also shown that the necessary conditions yield implications about discount rate to be applied on investment projects. In particular, satisfying minimal consumption may imply some wedge between consumers and producers interest rates, possibly implemented by tax or subsidy on savings.
Phase 2: Starting from some time T, assume a stationary state at stock S(T ) = µ S without extraction and consumption.
We have a stationary state with both sustainability constraints binding. The associated dual variables are positive. The necessary conditions (40) and (41) are not very helpful: for any T , there are many (non-stationary) paths w c and w S satisfying these conditions, with no other implications. We deduce from condition (36) that
Since capital has no use after T , we expect that all the capital stock is gradually eaten up before T is reached, i.e., lim t→T K(t) = 0. After time T , the marginal products F r and F K are not defined (the marginal products depend on the factor ratio r/K which is not defined after T ). Making use of information before time T , we have the following system of three differential equations: the Keynes-Ramsey Rule,
the Hotelling Rule,
and the transition equationK = F − c .
Together with the three boundary conditions
we can determine (in principle) the time path of (c * , K * , r * ) for given T and µ S . (NOTE:
we do not impose that c(T ) = 0). 
A.2.2 Infinite marginal utility case
In the case where U (0) = ∞, the phase 2 described in the previous case would not exist.
In this case there is some µ S > 0 that is set aside from the beginning. To determine µ S we can proceed as follows.
Consider the discounted utility maximization a la Dasgupta and Heal, and the associated value function for an initial stock of resource S 0 − µ S : We can now solve for the optimal paths. Froṁ
we obtain S(t) = S 0 exp(−δt/(1 − β)) (57)
and equation (56) 
For points (K, S) above that curve, we haveṠ < 0 andK > 0. Below that curve, we haveṠ < 0 andK < 0. It follows that the typical optimal trajectory has the shape of an inverted letter C.Starting with a low stock of K, capital at first rises, reaches a peak, then falls.
Given S 0 , the dynamic equation for K is, from eq (57) and (56),
To solve this equation, let us define
This is a first order linear differential equation in k of the formκ = M exp(−λt) − Dκ, which is easy to solve. 
